CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

FIRST AMENDMENT -

INDECENT

SPEECH RELATING TO COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE MESSAGES Is
CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED WHILE OBSCENE

SPEECH IS

NoT-Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ."' This mandate, however, has been subject
to varying interpretations, depending on the type of speech involved. Obscene speech, for example, has not been afforded the
first amendment protection extended to forms of expression labelled indecent. 2 In an era marked by significant technological
advances in communications, free speech rights under the first
amendment must be carefully balanced against important societal interests.'
The constitutionality of a complete ban on dial-a-porn recorded messages 4 has become a controversial issue in recent
years. 5 Dial-a-porn has received widespread attention since Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 (Act) to prohibit indecent, as well as obscene, commercially transmitted
interstate telephone messages.6 Supporters of the constitutionality of the Act argue that Congress has a compelling interest in
I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (because there is no redeem-

ing social value to obscene speech, such speech is not afforded guaranteed protection of the first amendment). But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 731
(1978) (while indecent speech is protected by the first amendment, it is subject to
limitations in the broadcast industry).
3 Tovey, Dial-a-Porn and the First Amendment: The State Action Loophole, 40 FED.
COMM. L.J. 267 (1988).

4 Dial-a-porn messages are sexually oriented telephone recordings.
Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).

Sable

5 L.A. Daily Journal, April 20, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
6 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988). Section 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended states in pertinent part:
(1) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording

device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any
person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication

placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control

to be used for an activity prohibited by clause (i); shall be fined in
accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
(2) Whoever knowingly-

547

548

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:547

regulating dial-a-porn messages and that the ban is properly
within the powers of the legislature. 7 Advocates further contend
that the indecent speech at issue is an "insidious form of attractive nuisance for children."
Opponents of the Act argue that the total ban on sexually
oriented pre-recorded messages is fatally overbroad 9 because
less restrictive means are available to prevent children from exposure to these messages.'" In other contexts, the United States
Supreme Court itself has held that the adult population cannot
be reduced to reading only that material that is fit for children,
noting that to hold otherwise would be akin to "burn[ing] the
house to roast the pig."" Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission 1 2 was the result of Congress' at-

tempt to torch the house by placing a total ban on both obscene
and indecent recorded telephone messages.
In 1983, Sable Communications, Inc. (Sable), a Los Angeles
based affiliate of Carlin Communications, Inc., began offering
sexually
oriented, pre-recorded telephone messages to the pub13
lic.

These messages were commonly referred to as dial-a-

porn.' 4

In order to implement its dial-a-porn service, Sable contracted with Pacific Bell, a telephone network.' 5 Under this ar(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording
device) any indecent communication for commercial purposes to
any person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication
placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by clause (i), shall be fined not
more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.

Id.
7 The compelling interest claimed is the limiting of the exposure of dial-a-porn
recordings to minors. L.A. Daily Journal, supra note 5, at 1, col. 2.
8

Id.

9 Id. Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe is one such opponent of the Act.
Professor Tribe informed the Supreme Court that although he would not want his
own children to hear these dial-a-porn messages, Congress exceeded its power by
banning them altogether. Id.
10 Id.
II Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the offensive material in Butler.
12 109 S.Ct. 2829 (1989).
'3 Id. at 2832.
14 Id. A typical message can last anywhere between thirty seconds and two minutes. Id. at 2832 n.l (citing Comment, Telephones, Sex and the First Amendment, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1986)).
15 Id. at 2832.
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rangement Pacific Bell supplied special telephone lines capable
of handling large volumes of simultaneous calls.' 6 Sable and Pacific Bell each shared in the profits. 7 These messages could
reach beyond the Los Angeles metropolitan area via the use of
8
long distance toll calls.'
At issue in Sable was the 1988 amendment to section 223(b)
of the Communications Act of 1934.'9 The amended provisions
of the Act imposed a complete ban on both indecent and obscene
interstate commercial telephone messages.20 Prior to the 1988
amendment, the Act restricted minors' access to these sexually
oriented dial-a-porn messages. 2 1 In order to accomplish this
goal, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to promulgate regulations to insure that underaged
23
callers would be screened. 2 2 Compliance with FCC procedures
would provide dial-a-porn sponsors with a defense against
prosecution.2 4
In 1988, Sable brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California seeking declaratory
25
and injunctive relief against enforcement of the amended Act.
Specifically, Sable sought to enjoin the FCC, as well as the Justice
Department, from instituting any criminal, civil, or administrative
proceeding under the Act. 26 In addition, Sable sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the indecency and obscenity provisions of the Act were unconstitutional under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.2 7 The district court denied Sa16 Id. A single pre-recorded message may be heard by as many as 50,000 people
hourly. Id. at 2832 n.1. (citing Comment, supra note 14, at 1223).
17 Id. at 2832.
18 Id.
19 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
20 For a relevant portion of § 223(b) see supra note 6.
21 Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2833 (1989). The preamended version of this statute criminalized the use of telephone facilities "to make
'obscene or indecent' interstate telephone communications 'for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age or to any other person without
that person's consent.' " Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(l)(A) (1982), amended by
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988)).
22 Id.
23 See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FCC
procedures.
24 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2833. The Act did not make these sexually oriented
messages a crime when played to adults, regardless of whether they were obscene
or indecent. Id.
25 Id. at 2832.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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ble's request for a preliminary injunction relating to the Statute's
complete ban on obscene telephone communications. 2 8 The
court did, however, strike down the Statute's provision concerning indecent speech. 2 9 Accordingly, the court issued a preliminary injunction against any communication alleged to be
indecent.3 0 Both Sable and the FCC appealed." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed Sable's
motion for an injunction pending appeal because the FCC had
filed a direct appeal.3 2 Consequently, Sable's appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction
to hear both appeals. 3
The first case to address the constitutionality of an obscenity
statute was Roth v. United States. 3 4 Roth, a New York businessman, published and sold obscene books, photographs,
magazines, and used circulars and advertising material to promote sales. 3 ' He was convicted of violating a federal statute
prohibiting the mailing of obscene material. 36 The Court in Roth
stressed that speech with any redeeming social value must be
given first amendment protection in order to allow the public to
28 Id. Sable argued that § 223(b) was unconstitutional because it created a "national standard" of obscenity. Id. Previously in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), the Court established that obscenity must be viewed based on "contemporary community standards." Id. at 24. The district court rejected this argument.
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832.
29 Id. The district court noted that this result is consistent with FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978), which held that indecent speech in the
broadcasting industry could be regulated. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832. Accordingly,
the Sable Court held that there was not an outright ban on such speech. Id. The
district court determined that "[wihile the government unquestionably has a legitimate interest in, e.g., protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn
messages, § 223(b) is not narrowly drawn to achieve any such purpose. Its flat-out
ban of indecent speech is contrary to the First Amendment." Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989) (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987)).
30 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832.
31 Id. Sable appealed the decision relating to the obscenity provision of the Act
and filed an emergency motion to enjoin the FCC pending appeal. Id. at 2832 n.2.
The district court granted the motion and the FCC appealed this preliminary injunction. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered
Sable to either move for voluntary .dismissal or to show cause regarding the court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 2832 n.2, 2833.
32 Id. at 2832 n.2.
33 Id. at 2832.
34 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
35 Id. at 480.
36 Id. Roth was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952
& Supp. IV 1956). Id. at 479. This statute provides, in pertinent part:
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express social and economic views.3 7 The Court, however, cautioned that the first amendment implicitly rejected obscenity as
having any redeeming social importance. 38 Accordingly, the Roth
Court held that obscenity does not fall within the boundaries of
constitutionally protected speech. s
The Court, in 1973, reiterated the holding of Roth, whereby
obscene material was not protected by the first amendment, and
endorsed the contemporary community standard of obscenity.
In Miller v. California,4" the defendant mass mailed unsolicited
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture,
paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; andEvery written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such
mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made,
whether sealed or unsealed...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in
the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same
from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or of
aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. at § 1461.
37 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). More specifically, the Court
stated that first amendment protection is granted to "assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 485. The Supreme Court reached the same result in United States v.
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). The defendant in Reidel was convicted of a similar
obscene mailing statute. Id. at 353-54. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute even though the obscene matter was distributed to willing recipients
who stated they were adults. Id. at 352. The Reidel Court followed the Roth decision, and noted that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), did not alter that
result. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 354. In Stanley, federal and state agents, while legally
searching for evidence relating to bookmaking activities, found obscene films in the
defendant's bedroom. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558. The majority in Stanley held that the
private possession of obscene material cannot be made a crime in light of the Constitution. Id. at 559. The Court distinguished the Stanley case from Roth, noting
that Stanley dealt with the fundamental right to be free from intrusion in ones own
home, as guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Id. at 560-61. The Court then
emphasized that Roth and its progeny were not impaired by this holding. Id. at 568.
The Court posited that "states retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that
power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of
his own home." Id.
40 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The first part of the Court's three-prong guideline for
defining obscenity is " 'whether the average person, applying contemporary com-
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sexually explicit material. 4 ' The majority noted that although the
powers and limitations of the states do not vary from community
to community, obscenity could not be gauged by a uniform national standard as to what appeals to the prurient interest. 4 2 The
Miller Court emphasized that the determination of obscenity is a
factual issue.4 3 The majority reasoned that it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to base the outcome on an abstract formulation, particularly in light of the size and diversity of our
country.4 4
The contemporary community standards issue was further
analyzed a year later in Hamling v. United States.4 5 Hamling was
charged with mailing obscene illustrations in violation of a federal statute.4 6 Applying the Miller standard, the Court maintained that a juror may draw on the knowledge of his community
or vicinage to determine how the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would decide an obscenity issue.4 7 The majority noted that the district court was at liberty to
admit evidence regarding standards of another location, if such
evidence would aid the jury in resolving the issue.48 Distributors
who transmit obscene material into more than one judicial district, the majority reasoned, may be subjected to varying community standards.4 9 Therefore, the Court determined that the
federal statute's failure to identify a uniform national standard
did not render it unconstitutional.5 0 The Court further acknowledged that such distributors may also be exposed to multiple
state prosecutions.51
In the 1968 case of Ginsberg v. New York, 5 2 the Court considmunity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Id. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S at 489).
41 Id. at 16-18.
42 Id. at 30.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 31.
The Court noted that "it is neither realistic or constitutionally
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York
City." Id. at 32 (footnote omitted).
45 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
46 Id. at 91-92. The defendant in Hamling was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1952 & Supp. IV 1956), the same obscenity statute that was at issue in Roth.
For the pertinent text of this statute see supra note 36.
47 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104.
48 Id. at 106.
49 Id.
50 Id. (citing United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)).
51 Id.
52 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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ered the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited the sale of
material which may not have been classified as obscene by adult
standards, yet would have a harmful affect on minors.53 The
Ginsberg majority reasoned that the state could subject minors to
more restrictions than adults, because the state is constitutionally
empowered to regulate when the well-being of its children is at
stake.54 Parents and teachers, stressed the Court, have the primary responsibility of safeguarding the well-being of their children.55 The majority recognized that the legislature reasonably
concluded that parents and teachers were entitled to receive support through laws designed to aid in this function.56 Furthermore, the Court concluded, such statutes do not bar parents
from obtaining obscene matter for their children if they desire.57
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 5s the Supreme Court reiterated the holding of Roth, stating that obscene material is not protected by the first amendment. 59 In Paris, two Atlanta, Georgia
movie theatres displayed adult movies. 60 The operators of these
theatres were charged with violating the state's obscenity statute. 6 ' The Court first noted that limiting obscene material from
exposure to juveniles and unconsenting adults was not the only
53 Id. at 631. Mr. Ginsberg operated a stationery store that sold "girlie"
magazines. Id. He was convicted of selling such magazines to a sixteen-year-old
boy. Id.
54 Id. at 639.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. In deciding this issue, the Ginsberg Court quoted an earlier New York case:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be
provided and society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of
children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them. It
is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a
statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special
standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.
Id. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334
(1965) (Fuld, J., concurring)).
58 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
59 Id. at 54.
60 Id. at 50-51. The entrance to the theatres were inoffensive, and a warning
sign stated: "If viewing the nude body offends you, PLEASE DO NOT ENTER."
Id. at 52. Another sign mandated that persons entering the theatres be twenty-one
years old. Id.
61 Id. at 51. The statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1968) reads, in pertinent
part:
(a) A person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials
when he sells, lends, rents, leases, gives, advertises, publishes, exhibits
or otherwise disseminates to any person any obscene material of any
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legitimate state interest that permitted regulation in this area.62
The Paris majority recognized that states also have a legitimate
interest in eliminating obscenity in public places and local commerce, provided such regulations do not infringe upon specific
constitutional provisions. 63 The Court stated that there was an
interest in the public's quality of life and in the total community
environment, as well as in public safety itself.64 The Paris Court
substantiated its reasoning with documented reports linking
crime and obscene material. 65 Although no scientific data conclusively proved such a correlation, the majority held that it
would be reasonable for the Georgia Legislature to determine
that such a nexus might exist. 66 Accordingly, the Court ruled
that because obscenity is unprotected by the first amendment,
there is no constitutional
barrier to prohibiting the distribution
67
of obscene material.

In response to the Court's rulings, legislatures have attempted to limit the distribution of obscene material solely under
the guise of protecting minors.68 In Butler v. Michigan,69 the
Court confronted the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited any person from making available to the public materials
which may have a harmful effect on minors. 70 Butler was condescription, knowing the obscene nature thereof, or who offers to do so,
or who possesses such material with the intent so to do ....
(b) Material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and utterly without redeeming social value and if, in addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such
matters.
Id. The constitutionality of the Georgia obscenity statute was upheld in Gable v.
Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969), afdper curiam, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
62 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
63 Id. See also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77
(1971).
64 Paris, 413 U.S. at 58.
65

Id.

Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 69. Outside of the obscenity area, the Court has steadfastly held that to
limit first amendment freedoms there must be a compelling state interest, and the
government's regulation must be accomplished with narrow specificity. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963). See also Hynes v. Mayor and Council of
Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (holding that the ordinance must be
narrowly drawn so as not to give governing officials unfettered power to decide
what messages people will hear).
68 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
69 352 U.S. 380.
66
67

70

Id. at 381.
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victed because he made available a book that had "obscene, immoral, lewd, lascivious language, or descriptions."'" The book,
however, was not considered obscene or indecent by adult standards.7" The Court held that this regulationwas not restricted to
the evil with which it dealt.7" In the Court's view, this legislation
was invalid, as it attempted to reduce the adult population to
reading material which was only fit for children. 4
The Supreme Court has, however, permitted control of material that is not obscene where the speech is broadcast over the

radio. 7 5 In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Founda-

tion, 76 the Court held that the FCC had the power to regulate
radio programming which was indecent but not obscene.77 In
Pacifica Foundation, a radio station aired a monologue by George
Carlin, a comedian, entitled "Filthy Words." 78 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, determined that the material was indecent and, unlike obscene speech, was protected by the first
amendment. 79 Although society may find this speech offensive,
the Court noted that this was an inadequate reason to suppress
it.8 0 Justice Stevens asserted that "it is a central tenet of the First
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas."'" The Court stated, however, that it is not
an absolute rule that the first amendment prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the content of the speech.8 2
Justice Stevens set forth that vulgar, offensive, and shocking
speech, such as that of the Carlin monologue, is not entitled to
absolute constitutional protection. 3 The majority emphasized
that broadcast speech receives the most limited first amendment
71
72

Id.

Id. at 382-83.
73 Id. at 383.
74 Id. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Butler, disagreed with the
state's position that by "quarantining the general reading public against books not
too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is
exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the
house to roast the pig." Id.
75 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 729.
78 Id. The broadcast aired at two o'clock in the afternoon. Id.
79 Id. at 745. The Court defined indecency as "nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality." Id. at 740.
80 Id. at 745.
81 Id. at 745-46 (footnote omitted).
82 Id. at 744.
83 Id. at 747.
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protection and noted two reasons for this limitation.84 First, such
speech goes into the privacy of the home, where the right to be
free from intrusion outweighs first amendment rights.85 Second,
the indecent material is easily accessible to children.86 The Court
thus granted the FCC the power to regulate indecent broadcasting, but emphasized the narrowness of its holding due to the differences between broadcast speech and other forms of
expression.8 7
Turning to the area of dial-a-porn, the first dispute involving
adult messages on the telephone arose in an administrative action.88 The FCC concluded, in this action, that section 223 of the
Communications Act of 1934 did not encompass dial-a-porn.89
In reaction to this ruling, Congress explicitly addressed dial-aporn by amending the Act.90 The amendment extended the Act
to include pre-recorded messages and sought to restrict access of
dial-a-porn to minors. 9 The Act also required the FCC to promulgate regulations by which dial-a-porn sponsors could screen
out underaged callers.92 These protective measures would act as
a defense against prosecution only if the defendant restricted access to adults.93
The first litigation to involve dial-a-porn, Carlin Communica84

Id. at 748-49.

Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)). The Court
noted that listeners of radio broadcasts are not given any prior warnings regarding
the content of the broadcast. Id.
86 Id. at 749. The Court maintained that young children can hear indecent
speech that they would not even be able to read. Id.
87 Id. at 750.
88 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing In
Re Cohalan, FCC File No. E-83-14, Memorandum Opinions and Orders Adopted
May 13, 1983, and March 5, 1984). The statute at issue, 47 U.S.C. § 223, proscribed knowingly "permitting a telephone under ones control to be used to make
any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent." Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2833
(1989).
89 Carlin, 749 F.2d at 115.
90 H.R. REP. No. 356, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2219, 2235. The relevant part of this statute made it a crime
to use telephone facilities to make obscene or indecent interstate telephone communications "for commercial purposes to any person under 18 years of age or to
any other person without that person's consent." 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(l)(A)(1982
Supp. II).
91 Id.
92 Carlin, 749 F.2d at 117.
93 Id. The defenses were available if the message provider took either of the
following two steps:
85
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tions, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (Carlin /),94 was a
challenge to the amended Act.9 5 Carlin Communications, which
provided a dial-a-porn service via pre-recorded messages, sought
an injunction against enforcement of the Act. 96 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit assessed the timechanneling regulation.9 7 The court noted that when a regulation
is based on the content or subject matter of speech, a higher
standard of scrutiny is required. 98 Thus, the court concluded
that such regulations are to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny
standard whereby a court must determine whether the regulation
enhances a compelling governmental interest.9 9 The court of appeals noted that shielding our youth from "salacious" matter is,
The
without doubt, a compelling governmental interest.'l°
court, however, asserted that such an interest may only be served
by narrowly drawn regulations.' 0 ' Furthermore, the appellate
prove that there are
court emphasized that the government 10must
2
no less intrusive restrictions available.
Applying the strict scrutiny standard to Carlin I, the court
posited that the FCC failed to prove that the time-channeling
regulation was well-tailored to restricting access to adults only,
or that less restrictive means would be ineffective. 11 3 Moreover,
the Carlin I court held that this regulation was both overinclusive
and underinclusive. °4 The court reasoned that the regulation
denied adult use during accessible hours and, at the same time,
the message was easily accessible to minors during the allowable
hours. 10 5 Additionally, the court noted that there was no evidence as to why a prohibition was necessary during school hours,
(a) Operating only between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.
Eastern Time or
(b) Requiring payment by credit card before transmission of the
messages.
Id.
94 749 F.2d 113
95 Id. at 115.
96 Id.
97

(2d Cir. 1984).

Id. at 120.

98 Id. at 121.

Id.
Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
101 Id. (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
637 (1980)).
102 Id. (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981)).
103 Id. at 121.
104 Id.
105 Id.
99
100
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or why there was no prohibition after 9:00 p.m. Eastern Time." 6
The court of appeals also determined that there was no conclusive proof that time-channeling was the least restrictive means
0 7
available. 1
Two years later, the FCC promulgated new regulations to
act as a defense against prosecution. 10 8 The FCC replaced the
time restriction defense with a defense based on the use of access
codes (user identification codes).' 0 9 Under this new method, the
caller had to provide an access code before he was entitled to
hear the message." t0 This code was received through the mail
after the message provider reviewed the application and verified
that the applicant was at least eighteen years old."' Thus, it
would now act as a defense if the message provider required
either credit card payment or authorization by access or identification code prior to transmission of the recording." 2 The FCC
13
once again rejected all forms of blocking."
In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (Carlin H), 1"' Carlin Communications challenged the access
code regulation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
again was not convinced that this form of regulation was the least
restrictive means to limit access to adult messages to persons
eighteen years of age or older. 1 5 The court remanded the case
and ordered the FCC to further explore the feasibility of shifting
the expense of customer premises blocking to the telephone
company and message provider, rather than passing on these additional costs to the customer.' 16 The court recognized that,
although the use of access codes may well be the least restrictive
means available, it must be established under the strict scrutiny
106 Id. During the day, children are in school under adult supervision. Id. Additionally, 9:00 p.m. Eastern Time translates into 6:00 p.m. Pacific Time. Id. In either
time zone, this is still early, considering it only takes about ninety seconds for an
unsupervised youth to hear the recording. Id.
107 Id. at 122. Furthermore, the court stated that the FCC did not show why
alternatives such as "blocking," or the use of access codes would be less effective.
Id. Accordingly, the time-channeling regulation was set aside, but the court did not
reach the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 123.
108 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 852 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64,201)).

109 Id. at 853.
110 Id.
'''
Id.

Id.
113 Id. at 852.
''4 Id. at 846.
115 Id. at 856.
112

116 Id.
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standard.1 7 Accordingly, the appellate court would not address
the constitutionality of the regulation until the FCC concluded its
examination of the cost shifting of premises blocking." 8
In 1987, the FCC again rejected customer premises blocking, in favor of a third defense against prosecution. 1 9 In addition to the two already presented regulations, credit card
payment and the use of access codes, the utilization of a message
scrambler would also be available to shield providers of adult recordings from prosecution. 120 Under this new
method, messages
12 1
descrambler.
a
without
heard
be
not
could
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (Carlin JJJ),122

considered whether the new FCC regulations were satisfactory.
The court concluded that the use of the three defenses now made
available by the FCC was a "feasible and effective way to serve
[the] compelling state interest" of protecting minors from these
pre-recorded adult messages. 123 The FCC proved, according to
the court, that less restrictive means were neither available nor
feasible.' 2 4 The appellate court further posited that customer
premises blocking would be too expensive and such devices
could easily be disabled by minors. 125 The court concluded that
descramblers were more effective, less expensive, and were not
unduly cumbersome. 126 While Carlin III did not address the
question of whether the government could use more restrictive
means, such as a total ban on all obscene and indecent speech,
this issue presented itself to the United States Supreme Court in
Sable Communications of California v.
12 7
Commission.

Federal Communications

In Sable, the Court considered whether Congress had the
power, through section 223(b) of the Communications Act 1of
28
1934, to prohibit obscene and indecent telephone recordings.
117 Id. at 855.
118 Id.

119 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 554 (2d Cir. 1988).
120 Id. at 549.
121 Id. Descramblers would be sold to adults only. Id. at 555.
122 Id. at 546.
123 Id. at 555.
124 Id. at 556.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 551. AT&T commented that battery operated portable descramblers
could be purchased at a low cost. Id.
127 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
128 Id. at 2831-32.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court,
holding that the obscenity provision of the Act was constitutional, but the indecent aspect of the Act must be struck down as
unconstitutional.' 29 The Court adhered to past decisions and
ruled that obscene speech is not protected by the first amendment.13 0 Accordingly, the majority noted that no constitutional
barrier exists pertaining to a ban on obscene recorded

messages. '3'
Justice White, writing for the majority in Sable, stated that
the Act does not contravene the "contemporary community standards" requirement enunciated in Miller v. California.'3 2 The
Court reasoned that the Act did not establish a "national standard" of obscenity any more than other federal statutes. 33 The
majority asserted that the absence of a uniform national standard
34
of obscenity does not make a federal statute unconstitutional. 1
The Court recognized that some communications may be considered obscene in certain communities and not obscene in
others.13 5 Justice White concluded that there were no constitutional barriers to prohibiting such communications. 1 36 The majority posited that the burden of complying with a prohibition on
obscenity rests with the message provider. 13 7 Justice White
noted that Sable could vary its messages to conform to each particular community it serves. 138 While the Court realized that this
may translate into additional costs for Sable, it would not render
the Act unconstitutional. 1 39 In accordance with prior decisions
relating to obscenity statutes, the Sable majority held that the
140
Act's ban on obscene telephone messages was constitutional.
Turning to the area of indecent speech, the Court asserted
Id. at 2832, 2839.
Id. at 2835 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973)).
131 Id.
132 Id. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miller.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2835-36 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)).
135 Id. at 2835.
136 Id. at 2836.
137 Id. The Court reasoned that communication companies, that wish to provide
this type of service, are aware that its audience extends into more than one locality,
and accordingly, must ensure that the message meets the various local community
standards. Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. Justice White recognized that there are many options available to assure
that the message will conform with local community standards. Id. Thus, the Court
held that the decision as to which option to utilize rests with the message provider.
Id.
140 Id.
129
130
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that the sale of indecent material to adults could not be made a
crime simply because the material was indecent.' 4 ' Because indecent speech is constitutionally protected, the majority cautioned that such speech may be regulated only to promote a
compelling governmental interest. 4 2 The Court further emphasized that the regulation must be the least restrictive means available to further that interest. 143 In order to pass constitutional
muster, the majority demanded that the legitimate interest be
served "by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms."' 14 4 The Court recognized that protecting the "physical and psychological well-being" of minors is a compelling interest.' 4 5 Furthermore, Justice White noted that this interest
included material that may not be considered indecent or ob14 6
scene to adults.

While protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech
is compelling, the Court reasoned that this alone is not enough
for a statute that bans all indecent dial-a-porn messages to pass
constitutional scrutiny. 147 In addition to a compelling interest,
the majority required that the regulation must be closely tailored
to achieve the ends sought. ' 48 The Court concluded that the Act
was not drawn narrowly enough to serve the legitimate state interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-aporn recordings.1 49 Thus, the majority held that the section of
the Act pertaining to indecent speech violated the first amendment. 50 The Court further reasoned that the Act was invalid because it limited telephone communications of adults to those
recordings that were suitable for children.' 5 ' The majority explained that the Act exceeded those measures that were necessary to shield minors from exposure to adult oriented
Id.
Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) (citations omitted)).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 2839. See generally Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (holding that
"the government may not reduce the adult population to only what is fit for
children").
141

142
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messages. 5 2 Accordingly, the Court asserted that this "legislation is not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to
deal."

53

The majority refused to accept the FCC's argument that a
complete ban is justified because anything short of a total ban
would not prevent minors from accessing the prerecorded
messages. 54 Justice White observed that the FCC had previously
determined that its credit card payment, access code, and scrambling regulations were satisfactory solutions to preventing these
messages from reaching minors.'15 Therefore, the Court concluded that these "screening" devices would be extremely effective.' 56 The Court reasoned that only the most "enterprising and
disobedient 7young people" would be able to gain access to the
messages.

5

The Sable Court next rejected the FCC's claim that these
rules were not effective enough because some minors could manage to gain access to the dial-a-porn recordings. 58 The majority
considered this argument unpersuasive because there was no evidence to support this claim.' 59 Furthermore, the Court found
that the FCC's procedures
had not been tested over a sufficient
60
period of time.'

The Court also took exception to the FCC's position that the
Court must defer to Congress' finding that there was no effective
way to shield minors, other than a total ban.' 6 ' While this finding
should not be ignored, the majority asserted that it was the
Court's duty to determine whether Congress had violated the
Constitution. 62 The majority was not convinced by Congress'
152

Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2839 (1989).

153 Id. at 2836 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
154 Id. at 2837.
155 Id. The Sable majority recognized that the court of appeals in Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988) held that these rules were a
"feasible and effective" method to serve the compelling interest of protecting children from indecent speech. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 2838.
158 Id. at 2837.
159 Id.
160 Id. In response to the FCC's contention that anything less than a total ban
would be ineffective, the majority posited that "[t]here is no evidence in the record
before us to that effect, nor could there be since the FCC's implementation of
§ 223(b) prior to its 1988 amendment has never been tested over time." Id.
161 Id. at 2838.
162 Id. More specifically, Justice White stated that "[d]eference to a legislative
finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake." Id.
(quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)).
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conclusion that there were no less restrictive means available to
16 3
protect minors from hearing these pre-recorded messages.
Other than conclusory statements, the Court determined that the
congressional record did not contain any evidence as to the potential effectiveness of the FCC's rules. 1 64 Justice White posited
that no congressman or senator stated on the record how often
minors could or would gain access to these pre-recorded
messages. 6 5 Additionally, the majority emphasized that the
FCC, as well as other witnesses, testified that the regulations ar166
rived at were effective and should be utilized in practice.
Rebutting the FCC's contention that Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation justified the total prohibition of
dial-a-porn messages, the Court noted the narrowness of the
Pacifica Foundation holding. 6 7 The Sable Court distinguished
Pacifica Foundation because it did not involve a total ban on the
broadcasting of indecent material.' 6' The majority next considered the unique attributes of radio broadcasting. 169 A radio program, in the Court's opinion, can enter the privacy of one's home
without any warning to the listener as to the content of the
show. 1 70 The majority reasoned that telephone communications
differ from radio broadcasts in that a caller to a telephone recording must take affirmative steps to hear the communication. 171 Therefore, the Court surmised, the callers intend to hear
Id.
Id. The enacted bill was introduced on the floor and was not accompanied by
a committee report. Id.
165 Id. See 134 CONG. REC. H 1691 (statement of Rep. Bliley), H1699 (statement
of Rep. Coats), H1690 (statement of Rep. Hall) (daily ed. April 19, 1988); S4377
(statement of Sen. Hatch (daily ed. April 20, 1988); Telephone Decency Act of 1987:
Hearingon H.R. 1786 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 15 (statement of Rep.
Bliley), 18 (statement of Rep. Coats), 20 (statement of Rep. Tauke) (1987).
166 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2838 (citing Telephone Decency Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R.
1786 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Financeof the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 129, 130, 132-33, 195-96, 198-200, 230-31
(1987).
167 Id. at 2836-37. For a discussion of Pacifica, see supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text, where the Court determined that special treatment of indecent broadcasting was warranted.
168 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837. The program in Pacifica was considered indecent
and was restricted to certain times of the day when minors were least likely to hear
it. Id.
163
164

169 Id.
170 Id.

The Court posited that a radio broadcast is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978)).
171 Id.
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the message and cannot be considered part of a "captive audience."'' 7 2 The Sable Court concluded that telephone callers are
willing to pay for the recording, and accordingly, cannot be surprised by an indecent message in the same way as a radio
listener. 173
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that a total
ban on adult access to indecent speech could not be approved
simply because a few children may manage to get access to dial-aporn recordings. 174 Justice Scalia, however, asserted that the reasonableness of such a statute depends on how many children will
have access to the message and how the terms "indecency" and
"obscenity" are defined.' 75 The Justice noted that a narrower
definition of obscenity means that more material will be included
in the residual category of indecent speech. ' 76 Accordingly, Jus77
tice Scalia called for greater insulation of minors. 1
Justice Scalia next joined the Court's opinion, stressing that
the majority did not mandate that Congress have conclusive data
regarding the ineffectiveness of the FCC's regulations in order to
render the Act constitutional.1 78 TheJustice reasoned that a statute placing a total ban on speech would be valid
if the proposed
1 79
regulations were ineffective and unfeasible.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Stevens
joined concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the
majority's ruling regarding indecent speech.18° Justice Brennan,
however, dissented from the Court's holding relating to the obscenity aspect of the Act.181 The Justice declared that criminal
penalties could not be imposed for the distribution of obscene
material to consenting adults. 182 Justice Brennan reasoned that
fair notice cannot be given because the definition of obscenity is
not sufficiently clear or specific. 183 The government, in Justice
Id.
Id. Justice White reasoned that "[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio
broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is
not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding
exposure to it." Id.
174 Id. at 2839 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172
173

175

176

Id.
Id.

177
178

Id. at 2840 (Scalia, J., concurring).

179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id. Because of the inability to sufficiently define the concept of obscenity,

Id.
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Brennan's opinion, does have a valid interest in protecting minors from exposure to harmful pornographic material.' 8 4 The
Justice set forth, however, that this interest does not justify an
"unconstitutionally overbroad" ban on all obscene telephone
messages for profit. 8 5 While the majority acknowledged that the
Act was overreaching as far as indecent speech was concerned,
Justice Brennan asserted that the same was true regarding obscene speech.' 8 6 Justice Brennan emphasized that a complete
ban is not necessary because the FCC's regulations would shield
minors from the telephone messages, and at the 87
same time allow
message.
the
hear
to
wish
who
adults
to
access
The Sable decision is a continuation of court holdings concerning which types of speech are entitled to first amendment
protection. Obscene speech is considered to be without any redeeming social value, and accordingly, is not afforded first
amendment protection. 8 8 Thus, the government may completely ban obscene speech. Indecent speech, on the other hand,
does fall under the umbrella of first amendment protection. The
FCC, however, may regulate such speech only if it conforms to
certain requirements. There must be a compelling state interest
at stake
and the regulation must be drawn with narrow specific8 9
ity.

Therefore, less restrictive means may not be available to

regulate the speech.
Sable is a logical extension of the Court's prior decisions.
The youth of today are the minds that will enhance our future.
To allow the thoughts of minors to be corrupted by obscene or
indecent speech would jeopardize the prosperity of the coming
years. Courts throughout the years have recognized this point
and have held that the well-being of minors is a compelling state
interest. It is an interest that must be protected at all times.
The dissent argued that obscene speech should be treated in
the same manner as indecent speech, in that as long as minors
are shielded from the recordings, consenting adults should be
Justice Brennan asserted that "the exaction of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is constitutionally intolerable." Id.
184 Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 775-77 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring in judgment)).
185 Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 13, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
186 Id. at 2840-4 1. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187 Id.
188 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
189 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-38 (1963).
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allowed to listen to the obscene speech. 190 The dissent, however,
was mistaken in thinking that shielding minors was the only compelling state interest involved. States also have a compelling interest in the public's quality of life and "total community
environment." 19 ' Furthermore, there was a reported nexus between obscenity and crime. Therefore, to permit even consenting adults to listen to obscene speech would be a grave
mistake.
Although the distinction between obscene and indecent
speech was not at issue in this case, it may have been beneficial
for the Court to further analyze and conclude as to the difference
between these two categories. The Sable majority neglected to
give any insight into what will make a recording obscene, as opposed to indecent. Without such a distinction, the future of diala-porn recordings remains uncertain. What is certain is that the
Court will allow Congress to place a total ban on the message if
the speech is determined to be obscene, and will not allow a complete prohibition if the speech at issue is determined to be indecent.
George Koroghlian
190 Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840-41 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).

